This short article sets out to consider the limits of liberalism and its associated humanism in the light of reading Ash Amin's recent A Land of Strangers (2012). The terms of the debate are pushed beyond the idea of libealism as belonging to an exclusively European and autonomous formation. In a postcolonial take, liberalism is considered a conceptual field in which hegemonic processes and procedures of governmentality emerged in the historical moment that Europe seized the world and transformed it into what we call modernity.
The accelerated hybridisation of Western society since the mid-twentieth century has accentuated the continuing reformulation of such key concepts as identity, nation, citizenship, society, democracy and belonging. These terms are increasingly exposed to multiple voices, often unauthorised by their presumed Occidental provenance. The existing political and historical script is unravelled to accommodate other possible narrations of a worldly modernity; a modernity that is not necessarily only 'ours' to manage and define. In this scenario, the stranger, as an unsettled and unsettling presence, the embodiment of a migrating modernity, becomes the political figure of our times.
Concentrated in the stranger, today embodied in the contemporary migrant, is the profound interrogation and subsequent interruption of a precise cultural and historical formation that now finds its practices and definitions disturbed, even displaced. We are confronted by limits: the limits of inherited definitions and the disciplinary procedures that reproduce and legitimate their logics. The critical merit of Ash Amin's nuanced arguments and detailed appropriation of the complexity of this situation is to bring the implications of this epochal shift forcefully to our attention. Working along, and across, the boundaries of human geography, political philosophy and sociology, together with a whole series of inter-disciplinary accounts of modernity, the author successfully manages to escape those institutional imperatives that inevitably reduce the questions encountered to the reproduction of existing authorities. Problems are established and sustained without rushing to immediate 'solutions'; arguments emerge that remain to ruffle existing explanatory maps. An uncomfortable, but necessary, critical challenge is posed, a historical opening sustained. In this sense, although I intend to suggest some questions that perhaps twist further and in a more extreme manner some of the premises of the book, I stand fully behind this undertaking. Amin's voice exhibits intellectual courage that insists on the necessity of interdisciplinary perspectives and is willing to abandon the shores of institutional securities in making its case.
Such a discussion takes place in a situation in which democracy itself (even in its most bland liberal version) is today being rolled back. The assumed inevitability of development and progress, in both economical and political terms, is now tottering on the edge of crisis and probable breakdown. The positivity of time guaranteed by linear development is spiralling sideward into seemingly unknown scenarios, while agglomerations of political and economical power are girding themselves to meet a multiplication of challenges and threats. The future, our future, is being colonised and disciplined for all eventualities, the doors on diversity are being bolted by discrimination. Concepts of citizenship and rights are under siege, legal definitions are sharpening the knives of distinction. A conceptual space is being transformed into a policed one, characterised by what Étienne Balibar would call 'conflictual citizenship' (Balibar 2008) . There is an emerging struggle over definitions and prospects: who, what, were and how does an individual become a citizen? Not only is citizenship being exposed to definition and redefinition but also its presumed guarantee by democracy is itself undergoing frequently unobserved revision. It would be well to insist that the present neo-liberal turn that publicly insists on the necessity of this redefining work as a political and cultural programme is equally tied to the longer liberal chronology of economic progress and its political representation. Neo-liberalism should perhaps be considered a radical variant within the liberal inheritance, and not an aberration. The expansion of Enlightenment ideas -however much they were betrayed in practice from their very beginnings -have run up against a wall, hung out to dry on the wires of security, patrolled by the fear that the world out there is running loose. If the West historically worlded the modern world, the processes it released have seemingly turned against the master. The Euro-American suffrage is being redrawn and withdrawn. The abstractions of intellectual activity are moving in a dramatically renewed landscape. I would suggest that a deeply instructive manner in which to read Ash Amin's book is in terms of a brilliantly executed guide to precisely that landscape.
The Occidental genealogy of the liberal universe that accompanies the development of capitalism reminds us of precise historical and cultural limits. Despite the rhetoric of universalism that has philosophically accompanied its development, the political economy that came to dominate the world from the seventeenth century onwards is the product of a precise time and place, In this tension between locality and universalism lies an acute tension; a tension that is enacted in philosophical, political, racial, ecological and cultural terms. If Adam Smith proposed the unlimited acquisition of the wealth of nations, thereby announcing the criteria for modern capitalist accumulation, the burgeoning economy of liberalism was also wedded to the idea of limitless moral and political resources. The twentieth century has consistently provided a series of brutal lessons that undo such illusions: from structural racism and genocide to ecological breakdown and economic collapse. All of this is to suggest that the languages and institutions of knowledge -from common sense to the refereed article -are also deeply imbricated in this manner of narrating the world, proposing reasoned perspectives and confident solutions. The risk today is that critical analysis, institutionalised in accredited journals, research exercise and academic evaluations, is increasingly over-determined by scholarly protocols and social science paradigms that are themselves part of the reproductive mechanism that the analysis might be seeking critically to contest and re-elaborate. This economy of knowledge, like the limitless accumulation presumed to lie in the material and ecological resources of the planet, believes that it can continually expand in order to renew and reproduce itself; that they are limits, boundaries, even barriers, to its universalising drive are rarely considered. Yet the overlooked matters of racism, the excluded histories of the subaltern, the negated cultures of a rejected world, cannot simply be incorporated in the next turn of the critical screw. Ash Amin's arguments help us to punctuate and forcefully interrogate this consensual economy. For there arrives a moment that necessary involves undoing the powers and knowledge which mapped the preceding order of sense before another configuration can emerge.
Reading this book we are constantly assailed by a persistent interrogation: Is it the case that we adjust or more radically adjudicate the system in which we are caught? We are suspended between pragmatic choices elaborated in a fading, and failed, liberalism and the desire for something else, something more that draws us into an alternative critical and heterotopic space with respect to established procedures and definitions. For example, the question posed in the central chapter of Amin's book on the 'remainders of race' sets in motion a series of questions that crack the screen of 'scientific' neutrality and annul the measured distance of the social scientist from his or her object of inquiry. Beyond the patronising platitudes of present-day multiculturalism, the critical evaluation of the racialising formation and the detailed racist exercise of Occidental bio-politics take us well beyond ideas of social adjustment, historical recognition and cultural 'toleration'. There is something altogether more extensive and profound involved here. Whether we like it or not, in order to respect the conceptual and conjunctural rigour of the question, we are propelled into a critical arena that calls for a radical revaluation of our past, present and future. In its becoming central, and not peripheral, to the historical formation and cultural constellation of Occidental modernity, the question of race promotes an unredeemable breach in the neutral whiteness of the social sciences paradigm.
For what emerges at the very centre of Ash Amin's book -the remainders and reminders of race -shadows the surrounding discussion by drawing us through the bio-political processes and structures of power and exploitation that orbit along the implacable path of planetary capitalism: 'You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich' (Fanon 2004) . The dove-tailing of the declared 'objectivity' of the social sciences in the First World with the bio-political economy of modernity is clearly unable to reply to the demands its 'objects' pose when they insist on their rights to be historical subjects and propose their versions of modernity. From the southern shore of the Mediterranean, from the south of the world, what does anthropology, sociology or political science have to say to these words of Assia Djebar: 'Don't claim to "speak for" or, worse, "to speak on", barely speaking next to, and if possible very close to . . . ' (Djebar 1992) .
Clearly existing hegemonic paradigms cannot be cancelled at a stroke; their critical traditions and disciplinary protocols are not to be obliterated. They have themselves been central to the making and understanding of modernity. As institutional discourses that consider their self-confirming logics to endow the world with sense, meaning and direction, they are nevertheless themselves susceptible to being worlded otherwise. They are exposed to unauthorised questions and rendered vulnerable in a world that does not simply respect their particular point of view and regime of truth. If the constancy of race and racism is the heart of darkness of Occidental modernity (remember for Joseph Conrad its location was Brussels and London, not Africa), then the figure of the stranger, the announcement of an interruption and interrogation, is not simply to be factored into historical accounts now willingly to register slavery, migration, colonialism and imperialism as pertinent chapters in the narrative. The colonial past inscribed on the body of the contemporary migrant is itself the tell-tale sign of the biopowers and politics that sustained the abstract and universal claims of modern Western knowledge in the racialised subordination of the rest of the planet to its political economy, to its cultural and political will. This is not a question of assigning guilt, or of seeking confessions. It is, rather, to attempt to establish a precise historical and cultural proposal, an opening that leads into another critical space.
Perhaps, as Jacques Derrida once suggested, it is the embedded, lived-in, space of the city, rather than the abstract space of the nation, that provides the laboratory for a more extensive and constantly negotiated becoming of democracy (Derrida 2000) . The blocking mechanisms of state legislation often come to be blunted and diverted in the textures and issues of the daily urban life. If the racialising procedures of power are exercised by the law, the realities of street life and cultural proximities often lead to gaps, negotiations and compromise. It is precisely here that the capitalist organisation and disarticulation of the 'social' is most effectively challenged. It is here that the structural and structuring logic of capital, seeking to colonise not simply the present but also the future, is most sharply exposed in its quotidian details and dangers. It is also here that the oppositional counternarratives of modernity acquire substance, a life, and flesh. And it is here that the historical and cultural interruption proposed by the stranger, the migrant and the regularly negated and despised 'other' acquires critical force, reminding us of a mutable and multiple modernity that is never merely 'ours'.
To talk of the structuring logic of capital and its imbrication in the racialising exercise of hegemonic powers is not to talk in terms of economic determinism.
Rather, as the present financial crisis has abruptly revealed, it is to talk of political structures and relations that are increasingly subservient to the social, cultural and historical constellation of today's political economy. It is not about the economyhowever that is defined -dictating the social and political order. It is rather about the forms and modalities that political, social and cultural powers acquire in a conjuncture apparently driven and disciplined by the market. It is about struggles, historical choices and critical options, and not simply the operation of the machinery of Moloch. The election of the 'market' to a metaphysical principle exposes an assemblage of factors and processes inscribed in the conjunctural possibilities of a specific political economy. It is not automatic, but rather the product of a whole series of pedagogical practices, increasingly supervised by the concentrated powers of the mass media, that install our understanding of the determining role of the market as 'natural', as common sense. Even within the capitalist organisation of social relations it is not the only definition available. It is only since the 'victory' of capitalism over socialism and the conclusion of the Cold War that it has acquired the force of inevitability and apparently become the unique structuring principle of the social order. It is the mantra of a global economic order that John Berger not so long ago bluntly called 'economic fascism' (Berger and Mohr 2010) .
The archive that is exposed here draws us into considering the formation of the liberal political economy and a history that spans several centuries. Within this complex narrative the requirements of property and the promotion of acquisitive individualism in order to enter the public sphere and political participation are a constant. The individual investment of one's body and mind -both in terms of measured labour and cultural adherence -is an explicit requirement for the social contract of recognition. This clearly narrows access to the demos. Other forms of social organisation are implicitly excluded. This is not to seek alternatives in tribal or collective organisations, but is to underline that the present configuration is neither inevitable nor natural. It has been constructed in the complex interweaving of economic, social, cultural and political processes. It is a volatile and fragile process, and not a permanent state of affairs. So, it is also mutable, susceptible to change and transformation. If we have experienced anything in recent decades it is that relationship between the state and the marked has rapidly altered in a radical manner. If the market was once apparently subservient and subject to the political and social demands imposed by the state, today, it is the state and its politics that is increasingly shaped and disciplined by the requirements of the market. So changes, and rather sharp ones, do occur. The political economy that sustains the reasons of the market is itself the result of certain political and cultural conceptions being transformed into practice and achieving a hegemonic hold on public understanding. Such 'solutions' carry in their train a whole set of consequences: from the manner of conceiving the 'self' to the planetary coordinates of what today counts as growth and 'progress'.
The necessary re-reading of modernity proposed in the present moment invites us to consider in particular its composition in the complex meshing of liberalism and capitalism. This is a political economy -the very term and practice itself a product of this formation -in which Occidental economical, political and cultural power becomes a hegemonic force on a planetary scale. It is where state, nation, market and 'civilisation' are increasingly wedged or striated within each other's making, and their separation increasingly untenable. That is why the question of 'value' is increasingly irreducible to a merely economical factor. Value, as a philosophical, political, aesthetical and moral category, is sought, established, transmitted and evaluated within the same, shared political economy. There is no going to the market to establish value; it is already imbricated in the very textures and tissues of both institutionalised and extemporised daily exchange. It is about a 'way of life'. This is why we are talking about a political economy and not simply about economics. This is also why the 'market' is by no means 'natural' nor the automatic consequence of historical 'progress': it is a construction; something that we are constantly being reminded of this in these heady days of financial meltdown and the flurry of attempts to promote and protect it.
Enclosing the world in its terms and producing modern private property by running English, Scottish and Irish peasants, or Native Americans and Australian Aborigines, off the land, are part and parcel of the formation of modern liberal philosophy and its associated apparatuses of critical and philosophical thought. Referencing John Locke's noted contribution to the drawing up of the constitution of the Carolinas (1669) and his influence on the future slave-owning democracy of the United States is to emphasise that the realisation of the modern, colonial world was its critical habitat. To fully understand the contemporary construction of the 'stranger', increasingly viewed and lived as a threat to a particular way of life, draws us into the hubris of a social and symbolic economy that is ultimately dependent on property and individualism for its hermeneutics. Those without property and the means of individuation are expelled from the narrative of legitimacy. As Sandro Mezzadra points out, this is the bordering effect of modern capitalist accumulation (Mezzadra 2011) . Setting the boundary, establishing the rule and subjecting the world to mirror the progress of the Subject of History, is not merely an economical matter. Insisting on legal precedent and pretensions, juridical interpretation and the philosophical rendition of a unilateral appropriation of the world, is a profoundly political and cultural affair. In this light it would be most instructive to consider the present-day explosion of Anglo-American law around the world, from patent claims to copyright wars. Within this precise historical formation lies the arbitrary violence that succeeded in establishing its universal claims. Its epistemological pretences are colonial and imperial ones as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has frequently pointed out.
Challenging the historical and cultural legitimacy of such actions leads to registering the violence and fragility of legitimation. This, once again, is to arrive at the very heart of darkness of Occidental liberalism. At this point, I am less prone to separate out the present wave of what is called neo-liberalism from the contradictory and complex formation of liberalism, as though the former were a crude and shameless reductionism of an altogether subtler and morally superior making. I do not consider liberalism and neo-liberalism to form opposite poles. They are accented differently and deploy diverse cultural and political resources. As part of the same historical constellation, the apparent tension between the 'welfare state' and the 'market' that they seemingly represent is ultimately to be considered on the contradictory terrain of a common political economy. Here choices are made, and prospects proposed. Where we find ourselves in the liberal spectrum clearly impinges on the outcome of such possibilities. It is here that the management of capital and the establishment of the limits of democracy are most deeply entwined.
The importance of this line of argument, sketched out here in an extremely brief and largely unexplored manner, lies not in proposing another and diverse political economy, as though that were possible in the abstract. It serves, rather, to acknowledge the profound limits -in terms of historical, cultural and political justice -of the existing one. Registering such limits permits the identification of practices and prospects that permit us to consider other critical and historical configurations that escape the numbing inheritance of Euro-American intellectual and cultural hegemony. Just as Antonio Gramsci has become a planetary figure who carries more critical weight in Latin America and India than in his native Italy, learning from an elsewhere that has translated, transmuted and transformed Occidental universalism into its own grammars of urgency is to open up a gap, an interval, in our understanding of property and the law, the market and social justice, democracy and the social sphere. The opacity proposed by embedded practices and lives elsewhere confound Occidental rationality seeking to render the world transparent to the universalising desire of its will. If modern anthropology has begun to understand this, much of the rest of the social and human sciences still remain very much in the dark. The so-called 'Arab Spring', unauthorised by Western politics, culture and its sciences, has operated a cut of this type. What emerges is that the Occidental template cannot be simply imposed. Its languages and technologies may well open up local counter-spaces and narratives -from rap music and heavy metal Islam to militant blogs and social networks -but they are always in translation, in transit, without guarantees; their apparent roots in the West provide somebody else's routes. The West in becoming the world loses its 'origins'.
The increasing multiplicity of sites of belonging -'from the local and national to the virtual, postcolonial and transnational' (Amin) -not only, and most obviously, weakens the seemingly habitual ties of a historic community but also wrenches up the tension of identification when tradition is challenged by the threat of dispersal and obsolescence. The very nature of who 'we' are is being pushed beyond existing frames of reference. It is a challenge that many would prefer to avoid. The appeals of purity in danger, and a homogeneity that provides a bulwark against the kaleidoscopic fragmentation of a modernity always more difficult to define and direct, finds ready recruits. Alien bodies, and the estrangement seemingly promoted by an autonomous technology, deepen the unease and augment the appeal for certainties. All of this is lived by the migrant as an experience that can neither be avoided nor negated. The encounter with others, hopefully achieving a certain form of accommodation, and the exploitation of technological resources (from Western Union to mobile phones), is an essential part of an ongoing journey. Here it is simply not sufficient to think that by modifying and opening up existing spaces the migration of modernity can be politically managed and culturally resolved from an authorised centre. The very making of the modern migrant, and the structural and immediate responses that seek to respond to, or negate, his or her presence, takes us far beyond the immediacies of social contact and cultural conflict into the urgencies of historical structures that precede and exceed such encounters.
By way of a conclusion I would like to take the liberty of drawing on a talk I delivered a decade ago in Vienna in the context of Documenta11. In the opening sequences of Werner Herzog's film Cobra Verde (1988) , itself based on Bruce Chatwin's The Viceroy of Ouidah, there occurs a discussion between a Brazilian plantation owner and Francisco Manoel da Silva, the future slave trader portrayed by Klaus Klinski. It goes like this:
I've another forty sugar plantations just like this one. I alone produce . . . 120.000 tons per year, and all of it goes to England. They've abolished the slave trade. They seize our ships, and yet without us they wouldn't have any sugar. Look at the way they buy the sugar, you'd think our rivers were overflowing with the stuff. It's grotesque.
In what the Caribbean poet Derek Walcott justly calls the 'bitter history' of sugar, here in the mid-nineteenth century we encounter an abolitionist Great Britain that since 1833 patrols the high seas, sequestering vessels involved in the slave trade, while continuing to enjoy the benefits of slave labour in the cotton that dresses its citizens and the sugar that goes into the cups of tea on domestic breakfast tables.
This suggests that the much-quoted process of 'globalisation' is not simply a contemporary phenomenon, but is rather integral to the making of Occidental modernity from its beginning. In this frame, both the forced black diaspora out of Africa into slavery and the systematic exploitation and genocide of the Americas emerge as central, not peripheral, to the global making of the modern Western world. Within this modernity the specific geopolitical location of the observer assumes a universal relevance: Occidental subjectivity and objectivity become one. This, of course, is humanism, and it helps us to understand the political significance of a proposed 'post-humanism' as the re-inscription of locality and limits into the point of view, the voice, the knowledge, that now finds itself speaking in the interstices of a heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous, world (Chambers 2002) . This is a world, as Paul Gilroy consistently reminds us, that was historically constructed in terror as well as in reason (Gilroy 1993) .
All of this is now coming home and taking up residence on our doorstep. The house we built is in need of radical rebuilding. Here, with the explicit exhaustion of liberal consent, and as the cruel night of a brutal political economy draws in, we must seriously consider other scenarios. Ash Amin's book most skilfully takes us to the edge of a liberal world in ruins, now naked and reduced to an increasingly brutal defence. At this point we need to transform that critical heritage into another emerging space, and there redraw the world along radically different lines.
